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Abstract—A trusted electronic election system requires that 
all the involved information must go public, that is, it focuses not 
only on transparency but also privacy issues. In other words, 
each ballot should be counted anonymously, correctly, and 
efficiently. In this work, a lightweight E-voting system is 
proposed for voters to minimize their trust in the authority or 
government. We ensure the transparency of election by putting 
all message on the Ethereum blockchain, in the meantime, the 
privacy of individual voter is protected via an efficient and 
effective ring signature mechanism. Besides, the attractive self-
tallying feature is also built in our system, which guarantees that 
everyone who can access the blockchain network is able to tally 
the result on his own, no third party is required after voting 
phase. More importantly, we ensure the correctness of voting 
results and keep the Ethereum gas cost of individual participant 
as low as possible, at the same time.  Clearly, the pre-described 
characteristics make our system more suitable for large-scale 
election.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Although some countries have begun to use electronic 
voting for national scale election[estonia-voting], there is still 
no suitable, trusted, efficient electronic voting system for 
people because it requires many contradictory properties. The 
election needs one or more authority for both authentication 
and protect the privacy of participant, however, it is difficult 
for voter to believe in the government or authority that will 
always follow the rules or never get hacked. There have been 
many studies and discussion on elections[voting-emp0], 
[voting-emp1] open all ballot to ensure transparent, then 
permute for anonymity, but it is still centralized and tally phase 
is time-consuming. [voting-emp2] proposed Open Vote 
network protocol, it is decentralized, anonymous and 
transparent. But it cannot tally the result even only one voter 
doesn't cast his ballot, which make their scheme only suitable 
for small-scale voting. With the development of blockchain, 
some work has discuss, electronic voting can use it as 
immutable, public bulletin board. [voting-emp3] run Open 
Vote protocol on Ethereum smart contract, make whole process 
more convenient. [voting-emp4,5] build their voting system 
based on blockchain. [voting-emp4] require all voter open their 
mask after voting, which property cause the same problem as 
[voting-emp2,3], and it is obviously unreasonable to force each 
voter to pay a deposit before voting. [voting-emp5] proposed a 
simple and efficient scheme, and introduced multiple authority 
to protect privacy of voter. But it is centralized and has some 
information that is not completely transparent. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Ring signature 
 The most important element in the electronic election 
is Anonymous. The relationship between voter and their ballot 
must not be revealed. Thus, we need a special digital signature 
scheme called ring signature[ring1], which was first proposed 
by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Yael Tauman in 2001. Ring 
signature has the property that a signer in a particular group 
can signs the message as group member, and verifier cannot 
distinguish the identity of signer. We can simply take this 
method to make voter sign the ballot anonymously but there 
will be another problem: a voter can cast their ballot twice. 
This is equivalent to double-spending issue on blockchain 
network. Thus, we adopt one-time ring signatures[ring2] 
proposed by Nicolas van Saberhagen, which ensures that a 
voter with one key-pair can only signs once, but can still sign 
as a particular group. We describe the one-time ring signature 
as following: 
 
Common parameters are: 
q: a prime number 
E: an elliptic curve equation 
G: a base point 
l: a prime order of the base point !"  : a cryptographic hash function {0,1}* → ()  !"  : a cryptographic hash function !(#$) → !(#$)  
 
 
• Generation 
 Assume there are a public key set {	#$	|$ ∈ [1, *]	}  , 
and a signer owns a private key !"   corresponding to a public 
key !"   . First, he computes another public key ! = 	 $%&'()%)  
called "key image", then applies the following transformations:  
 !" #"$,				"'				" = )#"$ + +",", "'				" ≠ )  
!" #"$%('"),				"+				" = -#"$%('") + /"0, "+				" ≠ -  
 !"   and !"   are random number selected from [1, . . . , %]  , then, 
compute the non-interactive challenge 
 ! = #$(&, (1, . . . , (+, ,1, . . . , ,+)  
 
Finally, the signer compute 
 !" #", "%				" ≠ (!- !"*"=0 	-./	0, "%				" = (  !" #", "%				" ≠ (#(-*(+, "%				" = (  
 
The one-time ring signature is  
 ! = ($, &1, . . . , &), *1, . . . *))   
 
• Verification  
Any verifier can apply the transformation 
 !"' 	= &"' + )"*"	+"' 	= &",- *" + )".  
 
then checks if the equation  
 !"#"=0 = &'(), +0' , . . . , +#' , .0' , . . . .#' )     holds. 
 
B. stealth address 
 With aforementioned one-time ring signature, voters 
can cast their ballot among particular set. But there is still one 
more thing, the information on the ballot cannot be public 
until tally phase. Thus, the message must be send after 
encryption. 
 
 We apply the unlinkable payments scheme proposed 
by Nicolas van Saberhagen [ring-sig2], which allows sender to 
generate different destination base on the same public key. In 
the other word, once we encode the candidate into public key, 
voters can send transaction to different address even though 
they cast to the same candidate. 
 
  It means that voters can obfuscate the observers who 
they actually vote for. Stealth address can be incorporated into 
our system as following: 
 
• A candidate !"	  ( or so called receiver ) has two standard 
elliptic key pair: ("#, %#)  , (	#$, &$)	  , where !" = $"%, '" = ("%  .  
• For a voter ( or so called sender ) who want to generate 
a stealth address for selected  candidate !"  : 
 He chooses a random number ! ∈ 	 [1, '-1]   and 
compute ! = 	$%   , the corresponding stealth address !" = $%('"()* + ,(  , then a ballot for the candidate !"  
is ("#, %)  . 
• Once the verifier get the private keys: ("#	, &#)		  of 	"#  
and the ballot information ("#, %)  , he can compute  
 ! = #$(&'() + +'  !" = (	&'(()*) + -))"  
 
 If the ballot is directed to corresponding !"  : 
 !" = (	&'(()*)" + -))"	 = 	&'(().")" + -)"	  = "#(%&')) + +' 	= 	-&  
 
 However, there may be too many redundancies 
computation when verifying ballots. We can further simplify 
the computation of tally by sharing all candidates' first private 
key pair ("#	, &#)	   as (", $)  . then the ballot ("#, %)   is for the 
Candidate 	"#  if  
 !" = $%('()" + +, 	= 	.(  
 
 There are other elliptic curve cryptography 
encryptions like integrated encryption scheme [ECC-IES] may 
be used, but must concern that the message (selected candidate) 
for encryption are limited and public-known.  
 
C. Key management  
 In a general election, information about election 
results should not be opened until tally phase. We need more 
than one people to share the first private key of candidate	"  . 
We take Diffie- Hellman key exchange to solve the problem 
as following: 
 
 (1)Alice and Bob pick a random number !"  , !"   and  
 announce !"#  ,	"#$   separately. 
 (2)Both them can compute !"	!$%   and make it public 
 (3)After voting phase, they submit !"  , !"   separately. 
 
 ("#	"%, "#	"%')   will be candidates' first shared key 
pair. The method can be easily extended to multiparty, and 
ensure even only one of them doesn't collude, secret won't be 
opened early.  
 
 We can further import deposit scheme to make 
participants follow the protocol. The method we chosen 
doesn't needs the secret be generated before sharing to avoid 
the involvement of centralized authority. Furthermore, we can 
ask key managers to sign a message then publish in first step, 
ensuring that they have the corresponding private key of 
public key. 
 
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM  
To make whole process transparent and convenient, we 
deploy our system on Ethereum smart contract and save all 
necessary information on it. 
The election can be split into three parts: 
A. Setup  
 
• Voter list: A set of public key, each one is a point on 
elliptic point and corresponds to a valid voter. The 
public key of valid voter should be appended on the 
voter list after authentication. The authentication 
process can be either centralized or decentralized. The 
former one can be conducted by third party. The system 
assures Anonymity of voters even relationship between 
identity and public key are publicly linkable. The 
property enable participants to supervise authentication 
process by checking identity of voter on the list. The 
latter one is integrated with decentralized 
verification[dec-aut], allow only the voters with specific 
credential publish their public key to list. 
 
• Candidate: For each candidate can be string or other 
data type. In order to generate public key for stealth 
address, voter can encode them into coordinate on 
elliptic curve by [h2p1, h2p2]. As long as voters have 
consensus on the deterministic hash function, ballots 
will be counted correctly at tally phase. Note that we 
hash the representation of each candidate !"   to get 
aforementioned !"  , the corresponding !"  is unnecessary 
in tally phase. 
 
• Secret sharing: The chosen key managers build shared 
secret as <chapter Key management mentioned> on the 
Ethereum smart contract. To ensure that key managers 
will submit their individual secret, they may need to pay 
an appropriate amount of Ether as deposit.  
  
B. Voting 
 For each valid voter has one of private keys 
corresponding to public keys of voter list and knows public 
information including candidates' first public key A, candidate 
list from Ethereum smart contract.  
 
 First, compute a ballot ("#, %)   for selected candidate 
by (", $%)  . !"   is the hash of candidate !"  , the point on elliptic 
curve.  
 Then, the ballot be signed with owned private key 
and one-time ring signature to get signed ballot (", $)  , ! =	 (%&, ()   
 
 Third, send signed ballot on smart contract with 
different Ethereum account. Note that if ballot sent by address 
corresponding to original private key directly, anonymity will 
be destroyed immediately. 
 
 Complex operations cost much on smart contract, so 
we reduce the computation as much as possible without 
affecting the correctness of results. We separate the 
verification of ring signature from voting phase. 
 
  As a result, everyone can try to send invalid or re-
voting ballots, but those wrong ballots can always be detected 
during the tally phase. A rational attacker will not cost gas to 
make a useless attack.  
 
C. Tally  
 Key managers should open their individual secret for 
retrieve their deposit and no one can vote after voting phase. 
Then, people who interested in election can access all 
information and tally the result by themselves. It means that 
they don't need to trust authority or someone, and the privacy 
of every participant is still protected by property of ring 
signature in tally phase. 
 
 For each valid ballot should signed with one-time 
ring signature. The signed ballot(", $)   will be counted to 
candidate !"   if  
 
1.key image !   never shown before 
2.	 "#$#=0 = '((*, ,0' , . . . , ,$' , /0' , . . . /$' )   
3.!"($%)' + )* 	= 	-.  , !   is product of key managers' secret. 
 
 Restricted by the upper bound of gas per block on 
Ethereum, we cannot count the ballots on smart contract. 
However, there will still be the same election result if 
everyone has consensus on counting method, which can be 
defined earlier on blockchain. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENT AND DISCUSSION  
A. Time analysis 
 Our measurements are performed on a MacBook Pro 
running OS X 10.12.5 equipped with 2 core, 2.7 GHz Intel 
Core i5 and 8 GB DDR3 RAM. For communication with the 
blockchain conveniently, we written our code in Javascript. As 
figure 1. shows, the time spent by voter is mainly to sign the 
ballot with ring signature, which is linear to ring size. And the 
verification time is almost the same as the time of genration, 
since the bottleneck of both is computation of ring signature, 
but it is still acceptable for voters to keep their anonymity. 
 
 Fig. 1. The generation and verification time of a ballot. 
B. Gas cost  
 It is obvious that data size of ballot is linear to the 
number of public key set, and the gas cost per voter is used to 
record information on the blockchain. Keep data on smart 
contract costs much more than keep on blockchain. In order to 
reduce voters' expenses as much as possible, we don't record 
the ballot information on Ethereum smart contract directly, but 
save it in normal transaction. The ballot information on smart 
contract is only transaction id of normal transaction, which 
allows us to reduce cost per voter significantly. We can further 
reduce that by save data on IPFS, which is a peer-to-peer 
distributed file system, then the ballots we save on the smart 
contract are pointer to particular file on IPFS. That is, the cost 
of each voter will be the lowest and constant, rather than linear 
to size of public key set. Namely, voters can choose the 
anonymity parameter they want without considering gas cost. 
 
 
Fig2. Gas cost per ballot on Ethereum 
C. Security  
 The security of our proposed system can be split into 
two parts: anonymity of voters and encryption of selected 
candidate. The former is protected by ring signature proposed 
by CryptoNote [ring-sig 2], which has been adopted by some 
cryptocurrency like Monero[XMR]. There are some studies 
analysis the traceability on Monero[traceablity1,2].  
 The temporal analysis doesn't work on our system 
because the transaction output is not related to input, and zero 
mix-ins problem can be eliminated by only tallying the ballot 
with more than specific number of ring size. 
 
 The encryption scheme we adopt performs a Diffie-
Hellman exchange, which build a shared secret from selected 
random number and public key of recipient on elliptic 
curve(ECDH). Another risk is colluding of key managers, 
although we can increase difficulty by increasing number of 
key managers, it is still possible to be attacked. In the worst 
case, all of them collude to retrieve shared secret key, can only 
make them tally the result earlier. Neither they can destroy 
anonymity of voters nor change the result. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
 We proposed a decentralized anonymous voting 
system which only requires minimal trust in others and gas 
cost per voter. By putting all the information on Ethereum 
network, we make the whole election transparent and all 
participants have identical information. Since the tally phase 
could speed up via parallel computation, the system is also 
suitable for large-scale voting. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT (Heading 5) 
The preferred spelling of the word “acknowledgment” in 
America is without an “e” after the “g.” Avoid the stilted 
expression “one of us (R. B. G.) thanks ...”.  Instead, try “R. B. 
G. thanks...”. Put sponsor acknowledgments in the unnumbered 
footnote on the first page. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  [estonia-voting] Martens, Tarvi. "Internet voting in Estonia." (2017). 
[2] [voting-example0] Pesado, Patricia, et al. "Experiences with Electronic 
Vote: Challenges and Solutions." Proceedings of the 9th International 
Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance. ACM, 
2016. 
[3] [voting-example1]B. Adida. Helios: Web-based open-audit voting. 
In USENIX Security Symposium, volume 17, pages 335–348, 2008. 
[4] [voting-example2] F. Hao, P. Y. Ryan, and P. Zielinski. 
Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion. IET Information 
Security, 4(2):62–67, 2010.   
[5] [voting-example3] McCorry, Patrick, Siamak F. Shahandashti, and Feng 
Hao. "A smart contract for boardroom voting with maximum voter 
privacy." International Conference on Financial Cryptography and 
Data Security. Springer, Cham, 2017. 
[6] [voting-example4]Zhao, Zhichao, and T-H. Hubert Chan. "How to vote 
privately using bitcoin." International Conference on Information and 
Communications Security. Springer, Cham, 2015. 
[7] [voting-example5] Bistarelli, Stefano, et al. "An end-to-end voting-
system based on bitcoin." Proceedings of the Symposium on Applied 
Computing. ACM, 2017. 
[8]  
[9] [ring-sig] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman, “How to leak a 
secret,” ser. Advances in Cryptology ł ASIACRYPT 2001: 7th 
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology 
and Information Security Gold Coast, Australia, December 9-13, 2001. 
[10] [ring-sig 2] Van Saberhagen, Nicolas. "Cryptonote v 2. 0." (2013). 
[11] [ECC-IES] Martínez, V. Gayoso, L. Hernández Encinas, and C. Sánchez 
Ávila. "A survey of the elliptic curve integrated encryption 
scheme." ratio 80.1024 (2010): 160-223. 
[12] [dec-aut] Garman, Christina, Matthew Green, and Ian Miers. 
"Decentralized Anonymous Credentials." NDSS. 2014. 
[13] [h2p1] Boneh, Dan, Ben Lynn, and Hovav Shacham. "Short signatures 
from the Weil pairing." International Conference on the Theory and 
Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, 2001. 
[14] [h2p2]Icart, Thomas. "How to hash into elliptic curves." Advances in 
Cryptology-CRYPTO 2009. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. 303-316. 
[15] [XMR] https://getmonero.org 
[16] [traceability1] Adam Mackenzie, Surae Noether, and Monero Core 
Team Burkhard. 2015. Im- proving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote 
Protocol. Research Bulletin MRL-0004.  Monero Research Lab.   
[17] [traceability2] Kumar, Amrit, et al. "A traceability analysis of monero’s 
blockchain." European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. 
Springer, Cham, 2017. 
[18] [IPFS] Benet, Juan. "IPFS-content addressed, versioned, P2P file 
system." arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.3561 (2014). 
 
